Abstract. In contrast to ordinary digital signatures, the verification of undeniable signatures and of confirmer signatures requires the cooperation of the signer or of a designated confirmer, respectively. Various schemes have been proposed so far, from practical solutions based on specific number-theoretic assumptions to theoretical constructions using basic cryptographic primitives. To motivate the necessity of new and provably secure constructions for confirmer signatures, we first describe a flaw in a previous realization by Okamoto. We then present two generic constructions for designing provably secure and efficient confirmer variants of many well-known signature schemes, including the schemes by Schnorr, Fiat and Shamir, ElGamal, and the RSA scheme. The constructions employ a new tool called confirmer commitment schemes. In this concept the ability to open the committed value is delegated to a designated confirmer. We present an efficient realization based on the Decision-Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Introduction
Digital signatures are an important tool for realizing security in open distributed systems and in electronic commerce as they guarantee the authenticity of data. In the common model, a digital signature can be verified by everyone (universal verifiability) and therefore its validity cannot be denied by the signer (non-repudiation). However , in certain applications universal verifiability is not desirable, for instance if a provable commitment presents valuable information, like in an auction with signed bids. Undeniable signatures, introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen in [7] , are a solution to this problem. Such signatures can be verified only with the signer's cooperation in a way that preserves the nonrepudiation property. This implies that a verifier cannot check the validity of a signature on his own. This property is called invisibility or simulatability.
[7] and [4] . Other solutions have the additional property that the scheme can later be converted into an ordinary signature scheme with universal verifiability (e.g. [3, 27, 21, 11, 22, 161). While all these solutions are based on particular number theoretic problems, Boyar et al. [3] show how to construct a convertible undeniable signature scheme based on any digital signature scheme.
A drawback of (convertible) undeniable signatures is that the signer could be forced to cooperate in the verification of a signature. Entrusted undeniable signatures [28] overcome this problem. However, a more severe problem is that the verification of signatures is not possible if the signer is absent or denies collaboration. This problem can be overcome with designated confirmer signatures [6] . In this scenario, the ability to verify signatures is delegated to an additional entity, called the confirmer. Concrete realizations were presented in [6, 261. Furthermore, Okamoto showed in [26] that confirmer. signature schemes exist if and only if public key encryption schemes exist.
Our Contribution: Several of the previously proposed undeniable signature schemes have shown to be flawed, as was described in [12, 20, 211, and it is possible to show that the entrusted undeniable signature scheme described in [28] is flawed as well. Here we point out in detail that the confirmer signature schemes by Okamoto [26] have a certain weakness as well.
The main result of this paper consists of two generic constructions for confirmer signatures. Unlike the constructions for undeniable and confirmer signatures presented in [3] and [26] , respectively, which are merely proofs of existence and result in inefficient solutions, our constructions yield efficient schemes (the practical construction proposed in [26] is insecure, see Section 3). We introduce a new tool named confirmer commitments. Compared to ordinary commitment schemes, confirmer commitments are not opened by the commiter but by a designated confirmer. Moreover, the confirmer is able to prove efficiently whether or not a given commitment "contains" a certain message without revealing any useful knowledge. We describe a concrete realization whose security is equivalent to the Decision-Diffie-Hellman assumption and discuss an alternative construction based on the higher residue assumption. Using such a confirmer commitment scheme and a secure signature scheme satisfying certain conditions, our constructions yield secure confirmer signature schemes. Possible candidates for the underlying signature schemes are, among others, the schemes by Schnorr [31], Fiat-Shamir [14], ElGamal [13] , and the RSA scheme [30] . Our constructions have the interesting feature that it is possible to choose the commitment scheme and the signature scheme, as well as the security parameters, independently. With respect to unforgeability, the security of the resulting confirmer scheme is equivalent to the security of the underlying signature scheme, given that the confirmer commitment is collision resistant. Whereas with respect to invisibility, its security is equivalent to the security of the confirmer commitment scheme. Finally, we outline how to deal with multiple confirmers.
Organization of the Paper: Section 2 contains our model of confirmer signature schemes. In Section 3 a previously proposed scheme is analyzed and a weakness is pointed out. Then we introduce the concept of confirmer commitments in Section 4. Section 5 describes how t o design secure confirmer signature schemes based on confirmer commitments and proof systems or existentially forgeable signature schemes. Some extensions are discussed in Section 6.
Model
The players in a designated confirmer signature scheme are a signer S , a confirmer C , and a verifier V . Note that it is possible that the signer also plays the role of the confirmer, in which case the scheme becomes an "ordinary" undeniable signature scheme. A confirmer signature scheme consists of the following efficient algorithms and protocols:
-Two key generators K G s ( l e ) -+ (zs,ys) and KGc(1') -+ (xc,yc). The parameter i! is a security parameter, (xs, ys) is a secret/public key pair for the signer and (xc, yc) is a secret/public key pair for the confirmer.
-A probabilistic signature generation algorithm Sig(rn, xs, yc) + 0 for signing a message m E (0, I}*.
-An interactive signature verification protocol (Cver, Vve,) between the confirmer and the verifier:
The private input of Cver is xc and the common input consists of m, g , ys, and yc. After a successful protocol execution the verifier's output (indicated by -+v) is either 1 or 0. Note that in some realizations there exist separate protocols for confirming and denying signatures. However, these two protocols can easily be merged into a single protocol.
Remarks: In this model, both confirmation and disavowal are delegated t o the confirmer. However, the signer is always able to confirm (but not necessarily to deny) a signature generated by himself by proving his knowledge of the secret key and of the random values used for generating this signature. In certain applications it could be useful that the signer also knows the key xc or if a scheme with multiple confirmers is used (see Section 6 ) .
Moreover, the confirmer is able t o (totally) convert the scheme into an ordinary signature scheme by releasing his secret key xc. A confirmer signature scheme must meet the following security requirements.
-Unforgeability of signatures: There exists no polynomial time algorithm which, on input ys, yc, xc (computed using the key generators) and given access to the oracle Os, outputs with non-negligible probability an arbitrary correct message-signature pair (m', a') for a message m' 6 M s . Note that the simulator Sim does not need the message m as input. This makes the invisibility property even stronger than the usual simulatability property since the message of a correct message-signature pair ( m ,~) can be replaced by any message m' (as long as m' is chosen independently of a)
without enabling a verifier to find out that (m', a) is incorrect.
-Consistency of verification: For all Cpcr and all (correct and incorrect) message-signature pairs ( m , a) the following equation must hold except with negligible probability. Informally, this means that the confirmer cannot claim that a correct (incorrect) signature is incorrect (correct).
-Non-transferability of verification: The verification protocol (Cver, Vver) is a minimum knowledge bi-proof (according to the definition given in [15] ).
Note that these security requirements are very similar to the requirements for convertible undeniable signature schemes presented in [ll] .
A Weakness in a Previous Scheme
In this section we review one of the confirmer signature schemes proposed in [26] and point out that the confirmer can forge signatures of the signers. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q and let g be a generator of G. Let h denote a collision resistant hash function. The scheme works as follows. .
The confirmer gives an interactive zero-knowledge proof that logyc g = logTl ? (mod q ) holds or not by using the protocols in [4] . The signer can confirm a signature by giving an interactive zero-knowledge proof that logyc ? log,rl (mod q ) holds. is satisfied as well.
The attack can also be adopted to the general construction based on proofs of knowledge and therefore also to special instances as the Fiat-Shamir based scheme [26] . If r1 is an additional input of the hash function, the attack is countermeasured.
Confirmer Commitments

Definition
A confirmer commitment scheme (CKG, Corn, Sh) consists of a commiter, a confirmer, a verifier, and the following efficient algorithms and protocols:
-A key generation algorithm CKG(1') + (zc, y c ) , where l! is a security parameter and (zc, y~) is a secret/public key pair for the confirmer. 
is a commitment for m (C;h ( w ) , T / S h o ) ( m , d , Y c ) = v
except with negligible probability.
edge bi-proof (according to the definition given in [15] ). Confirmer commitment schemes have many similarities with probabilistic encryption schemes [17] . In fact probabilistic encryption schemes are a special case of confirmer commitments with the additional property that the message m can be derived (i.e. decrypted) from the commitment (cipher-text) d.
4.2
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q for which it is infeasible to compute discrete logarithms. Let further h, : {0,1}* + 2, denote a collision resistant hash function. Then a secure confirmer commitment scheme can be constructed as follows. An efficient protocol for such a zero-knowledge bi-proof can be found in [22] and is reviewed in the appendix B.
A Realization Based on the Decision-Diffie-Hellman Problem
For the security analysis we make use of the following assumption.
Decision-Diffie-Hellman Assumption: Let the two sets Q and D'i4 be defined as follows:
Note that the elements of D'i4 correspond to a Diffie-Hellman key exchange with base base element g1 , exchanged values y1 and g2, and resulting key y2. The DDH assumption says that two random variables which are uniformly distributed over Q and VX, respectively, are computationally indistinguishable.
Let us now show briefly that the above scheme meets all security requirements. for a,/? E R Z,. If the DDH sample was in D'H, the resulting samples are random commitments for m with regard t o the public key y c = (9, z). Otherwise, the resulting samples are distributed according t o the distribution of the simulator.
-Consistency and non-transferability of showing: These two properties are direct consequences of the soundness property and the zero-knowledge property, respectively, of the interactive bi-proof system. The proofs of these two properties can be found in [22].
Confirmer Signatures Using Confirmer Commitments
At a first glance, an obvious realization of a confirmer signature scheme based on a confirmer commitment scheme and any secure digital signature scheme would be the following. Instead of signing a message m directly, i.e. computing
Sig(rn), the signer first computes a confirmer commitment d = Com(rn, y c ) and then generates a signature on this commitment, i.e. c 7 = Sig(d). A verifier can check that (T is a correct signature on d, but since he cannot check whether d is a commitment for m, the verification is only possible with the cooperation of the confirmer. Such a scheme is sufficient in many practical applications, but it does not satisfy our security requirements. More presicely, it does not meet the requirements for the invisibility property because in general no simulation of signatures is possible. In this section we show that for two large classes of digital signature schemes, namely those based on 3-move proofs of knowledge and existentially forgeable signatures, it is possible to design related confirmer signature schemes that meet the requirements defined in Section 2.
Proofs of Knowledge and Proof-Based Signatures
Let R c X x y be a polynomial time checkable relation for which random samples (z,y) E R can be computed efficiently, but for which it is infeasible, given y E Y , to find an z E X such that (z, y ) E R. Let (P, V ) be a proof of knowledge for the relation R (see [24] for definitions) between a prover P and a verifier V . Informally, on common input y the protocol ( P , V ) allows P to convince V about his knowledge of a value 2 satisfying ( 5 ,~) E R. We assume that (P, V ) has the following properties:
-(P, V ) consists of exactly three moves and the only active role of the verifier V is to announce a random t-bit challenge in the second move. The value t is a security parameter and is chosen such that successful cheating is possible only with negligible probability (e.g. t = O(ly1)). Using the techniques of [2, 291 it can be proved that under the assumption that h is a truly random function, breaking such a signature scheme (with an adaptive chosen message attack) is as hard as finding the secret key x.
Proof-based Confirmer Signatures
Using a confirmer commitment scheme a proof of knowledge of the type described above can also be turned into a secure confirmer signature scheme in the following way ( h is the collision resistant hash function used above). Under the assumption that h is a truly random function it can be shown that this scheme meets all security requirements of a confirmer signature scheme.
-Unforgeability of signatures: We show that any algorithm A that can forge signatures with non-negligible probability can be used t o find the signer's secret xs which contradicts the assumptions about the relation R. Without loss of generality we assume that A evaluates h for distinct arguments only (see also [29] ). We take control over h to simulate queries t o the oracle 0 s (this simulation is not done by using the simulator of the confirmer signature scheme but by taking control over h ) : on input m we first compute ( , s', d) . We show that with this simulator, the invisibility property of the signature scheme is equivalent to the invisibility property of the confirmer commitment scheme. As above, we take control over the function h and simulate queries to 0 s . Queries to the oracle OV can be simulated as follows: on input (m, ( T , s, d ) ) we return 1 if and only if Accept(r, h(d), s, ys) = 1 and 0 s has returned a signature containing T and d (note that in all other cases the signature must be incorrect because of the unforgeability property). Now it can easily be seen that if the original algorithm was able to distinguish correct and simulated signatures, the modified algorithm would be able to distinguish real commitments from simulated ones.
-Consistency and non-transferability of verification: These two properties are direct consequences of the corresponding properties of the confirmer commitment scheme.
Example: Schnorr's identification scheme [31] is a typical example of a proof of knowledge that can be converted into a confirmer signature scheme. Let q and p be prime numbers with g x 2200, p x 21024, and g ( ( p -1). Let further g denote a generator of the subgroup G of "1: of order q. The signer's public key is y s = gxS for a randomly chosen xs E R Z,. A message m is signed by computing T := gk for k E R Z,, d := Com(mIlr,yc), and s := k -h(d)xs (mod 4 ) . The resulting signature is the pair ( s , d ) . Note that in the Schnorr scheme T equals g"yi(d) and therefore r need not be part of the signature. The signature can be verified by asking the confirmer to show that d is a commitment for mllr.
With the confirmer commitment scheme described in section 4.2 (using the same group G) the efficiency of this Schnorr-based confirmer scheme is as follows. The signature is 2248 bits long and its generation requires roughly 900 multiplications modulo p . During the interactive verification of a signature, 6120 bits of data are exchanged, the confirmer computes about 2250 modular multiplications, and the verifier computes about 2450 modular multiplications (see appendix B). This compares favourably with the schemes presented in [ll, 221.
Existentially Forgeable Signatures
Apart from the proof-based signature schemes, there exists also a generic construction for existentially forgeable signatures. More precisely, we consider signature schemes ( K C , Szg' , Ver*) that meet the following requirements. -There exists a finite group B with binary operation 0 and inversion function inv (both efficiently computable) such that the probability distribution of messages generated by ExistForge and the uniform distribution over B are indistinguishable.
-Let h B : {0,1}* + B be a collision resistant hash function. It is easy to see that the ElGamal signature scheme [13] and some of its variants satisfy these conditions as well.
Confirmer Signatures Based on Existentially Forgeable Signatures
Let ( K C , Sag*, Ver*) be an existentially forgeable signature scheme of the type defined above. Using a confirmer commitment scheme (CKG, Corn, Sh) it is possible to construct a confirmer signature scheme as follows.
-Key generation: KGs := K C and KGc := CKG Signature generation:
The resulting signature is the triple (a*, d, b ) . 
The efficiency of this scheme with small public exponent e compares favourably with the undeniable signature scheme of [16] .
Extensions
In this section we suggest another realization of the confirmer commitment based on an alternative number theoretic assumption. Then it is outlined how to deal with multiple confirmers. Moreover, based on any efficient confirmer signature scheme an efficient fair contract signing scheme with off-line trusted party (see e.g.
[I] for the model) can be realized, but details are omitted here.
Confirmer Commitment Scheme Based on the Higher Residues
It is desirable to design confirmer commitments based on other well established number theoretic assumptions. that a commitment is well-formed. Therefore, a minimum knowledge argument is added to each commitment in order to prove that the commitment is well formed. Such proofs can easily be constructed using the techniques of [lo] for proving that one of two statements is true without revealing which.
Multiple Confirmers
An obvious extension of the basic confirmer signature model is t o allow several confirmers C1, . . . , C, to verify signatures.
For instance, this can be achieved by modifying the confirmer commitment scheme as follows: a multi-confirmer commitment for a message m is a n-tuple of individual commitments, i.e. (Com(m,yc,) , . . . , Com(rn,yc,)). A verifier now needs to ask only a single confirmer t o verify a signature. However, in order t o guarantee the consistency of verification, the signer has to provide a proof that the individual commitments in the tuple are all commitments of a single message. For the discrete logarithm based solution presented in Section 4 this is very simple: for the n + 1-tuple (ga+hq(m), y& , . . . , y , % J the signer proves that discrete logarithms of the last n group elements to the corresponding bases are all equal. It is possible that the signer is one of the confirmers. This enables him to confirm correct signatures and/or to deny incorrect signatures on his own. More complex access structures are possible as well, e.g. a scheme where the collaboration of at least k out of the n confirmers is required t o verify a signature.
A Sketch of a Security Proof
Under the assumption that hB is a truly random functions it can be shown that this scheme meets all security requirements of a confirmer signature scheme.
-Unforgeability of signatures: Let h' denote another truly random function.
Using the techniques of [29] we show that forging confirmer signatures is as hard as forging digital signatures of the underlying scheme using the hash function h'. Let A be an efficient algorithm for forging signatures. We take control over h to simulate the oracle 0 s (see the proof of the proof-based signatures). With non-negligible probability A will return a correct messagesignature pair (m, (a*, d , b ) ) . We guess the position at which hB is evaluated with the argument d and replace its output by h'(m) 0 inv(b). Again with non-negligible probability, A will return a correct message-signature pair ( m , (a', d , b') ). Since the confirmer commitment scheme is assumed to be collision resistant, b and b' must be equal. But then we have hB(d) 0 b' = h'(m) and therefore a' is a correct signature on m in the secure variant of the underlying signature scheme using the hash function h'.
-Invisibility of signatures: A simulated signature for a message m can be computed as follows: using the simulators of the commitment scheme and of the existentially forgeable signature scheme one computes d := CSirn(yc) and (m*,a*) := EzistForge(ys), respectively. Then, one computes b := inv(hB(d)) @ m* (note that m* E B with overwhelming probability). The
